petrino_2007

Down and Out in Atlanta

pigskinrevolution.com

No one can dispute the hardship Bobby Petrino has had to endure since he left a successful college post at Louisville
to try his hand in the NFL. He stepped right into the firestorm of the Michael Vick debacle, and with that, has had to
take the reigns of a severely downgraded offense. All this being said, Petrino’s performance Monday night against
the Giants showed all the signs of a beaten man.

Over the past two seasons we have witnessed a variety of coaching blunders. In some cases NFL coaches squander
10% or more GWC on a single play. Another important factor is the relative cost of the decision.   This figure is
calculated as the percentage of GWC lost as a fraction of the total GWC. Suppose a team is trailing by 6 points and
has one play left on the clock from their own 1 yard line. If the quarterback took a knee and let the clock run out he
would probably need security to escort him past the rabid fans. In such an instance, the quarterback (or coach who
made the call) would have given up far less than 1% total GWC, but would still have made a serious blunder. By
taking the knee he gives up 100% of whatever small winning chance he had. This observation holds true with our
2006 CCI rankings as well. We may criticize Mike Nolan for throwing away more total GWC than any other coach in
the league (~1.5 games) while Lovie Smith may have received congratulations for his position near the top of the
pack. In reality, Lovie may have had fewer opportunities to give away GWC than Nolan while still making relatively
poor decisions. The most important lesson from last years CCI rankings is that all NFL coaches fall short of their
potential….well short.

Petrino’s decisions late in the game on Monday were puzzling to say the least. Here are 3 in succession that caught
our attention:





In each instance, Petrino had an opportunity for a more aggressive action and chose a passive option - the punt. The
prospect of converting a long fourth down never looks appetizing to a coach. This is simply because they are not a
favorite to succeed in absolute terms. But if they consider the fact they are losing the game and losing badly, the punt
becomes nothing more than a slow death march. Consider the second example in the table where the Falcons have
a 4th and 3 on their own 36. Their GWC is approximately 3% at this point. They need to gain 97% before they lose
3% in order to win the game. These odds are long indeed but not completely hopeless. Retaining possession
becomes paramount at this stage of the game. With less than 10 minutes remaining, there is very little time to make
up 97% GWC. Every offensive opportunity now matters.   It appears that Petrino is counting on the prospects of
stopping the Giants on a ‘3 and out’ (something they have had great difficulty accomplishing thus far in the game) and
regaining possession. Interestingly, if the Falcons were to successfully regain possession 2 minutes later with a 1st
and 10 on their own 25 yard line and still trailing by 14, their GWC will have dropped by 1%. This shows the
importance of reacting appropriately to the decaying clock and large deficit. Amazingly, a seemingly favorable
sequence of events, (the very sequence Petrino is wishing for as he punts), results in a 1/3 reduction of his winning
chances.

Petrino may have been dealt a bad hand in Atlanta, but he doesn’t appear to be helping his own cause.

SCORE	QUARTER	CLOCK	BALL POSITION	DOWN	YARDS TO FIRST	ACTUAL PLAY	GWC COST	% OF AVAILABLE GWC
10 -21	3RD	3:57	NYG 42	4TH	8	PUNT	1.6%	11.5%
10 - 24	4TH	9:42	ATL 36	4TH	3	PUNT	0.7%	21.2%
10 - 24	4TH	4:57	ATL 29	4TH	8	PUNT	0.6%	42.8%