MAKE THE MOST OF WHAT YOU HAVE
Pigskinrevolution.com
Very late in the 2006 Super Bowl with Seattle driving but trailing by 11 points, ABC TV announcers Al
Michaels and John Madden suggested that the Seahawks should take an early (pre-4th down) field goal so
as to save time to score the touchdown. Here we take a quantitative look at this strategy using ZEUS.
In this particular situation, Seattle did not get into field goal range until 35 seconds remained in the game.
With no timeouts left and the clock running, Matt Hasselbeck spiked the ball to stop the clock at 34 seconds.
It was 2nd and 10 at the Steelers’ 26 yard line, so an immediate field goal would be 44 yards in length. Is
bringing the field goal team on the field right now the correct strategy?
First let’s look at what Seattle had to accomplish to win the game. They needed six points from a touchdown,
a two point conversion, a successful recovery of an onside kick plus a field goal. And this just to get them into
overtime – they would have had a 50-50 chance of winning after accomplishing all of that. It’s not hard to see
that their chances of winning the game were quite small. But that’s no reason to waste what little equity is
available in the most important game these players would ever participate in.
ZEUS analysis says that passing into the end zone is the correct decision, giving them 0.33% (1 chance in
300) of winning the game. An immediate field goal attempt wins the game 0.20% (1 in 500). Admittedly
going for the field goal cost little, but in relative terms it sacrifices 0.13% GWC of the available 0.33% GWC,
or 40% of the current value of the game.
On the surface one might not expect it to matter which type of scoring play Seattle should attempt first since
they need both the touchdown and the field goal, regardless. However, by trying for the TD on the first drive
they don’t rule out settling for the field goal later in that drive (for example, when reaching fourth down). By
going for the field goal immediately they take away any options for the future, and now would have no choice
but to drive all they way to the end zone on their next possession.
Another issue is field position. For example, suppose the second drive reaches the 35 yardline with only
enough time for one play. A 53 yard field goal, although difficult, is a lot easier than a 35 yard touchdown.
Finally, the clock can be more efficiently used if the touchdown comes first. On the second drive, once field
goal range is reached and if adequate time remains, Seattle can attempt to get even closer to the end zone
to increase the chances of converting the field goal. And if there happens to be enough time on the clock for
the opponent to attempt a couple plays, that time can be used up before attempting the field goal. Needing a
touchdown, the luxuries of simply trying for better field position and/or using up clock are not available. Unlike
a medium or short range field goal, the six point attempt does not have an 80-90% likelihood of success.
Admittedly we are discussing a long shot scenario in any case. But the principles involved are significant
and carry over to many more common and more profitable situations. Managing the clock efficiently,
optimizing scoring based upon field position, keeping your options open, and maximizing game winning
chances are fundamental to winning football programs.