| Beyond the Obvious King Kaufman, Mike Holmgren and 4th downs pigskinrevolution.com An increasing number of informed NFL observers are questioning the conservative play-calling of NFL coaches. Greg Easterbrook has repeatedly expressed his distaste for the punt and Michael Lewis published an essay last season in ESPN Magazine where he called out many coaches for their over-conservative natures on 4th down. Of course we at pigskinrevolution.com haven’t been shy about this issue either. Our 2006 CCI rankings shed some much needed light on this coaching affliction. While it is still too early to tell, we are not holding our breath that the coaching scorecard on critical calls will show much improvement in 2007. Recently, King Kaufman at Salon.com commented on 4th down decisions and more specifically on Mike Holmgren’s choice to kick a field goal against Arizona early in the 4th quarter. The score was tied and the Seahawks faced a mere 4th and 1 on the Cardinal’s 10 yard line. Not surprisingly, ZEUS concurs with King Kaufman on the call in question, but we also discovered that he didn’t dig deep enough. ZEUS rates Seattle’s decision as a 3.4% GWC mistake with highest confidence. This means that under nearly any configuration of opposing strengths and weaknesses, even extreme cases, it is absolutely wrong to kick the field goal. As evidenced by Kaufman’s passionate piece in Salon, it doesn’t take ZEUS to intuitively recognize that Holmgren is whimping out in this situation and costing his team a bundle. Holmgren gave up approximately 0.7 games last season on critical calls alone which placed him in the middle of the coaching pack. So while he is no Mike Nolan (who gave up about 1.5 games) he does have some room for improvement. It should also be noted that earlier in the 3rd quarter, Seattle went for it on a 4th and 1 from the Arizona 16 when trailing by 10 and scored a touchdown. A result, as Kaufman points out, that should have boosted their confidence on the 4th quarter decision. One has to wonder at what specific score differential does the choice to kick tip into favor for the likes of Holmgren. Is it a gut feeling, or does he have a specific criteria for his choice? We strongly suspect it is the former. Interestingly, what goes completely unnoticed (by Kaufman and most everyone else we assume) was the 4th and 5 Seattle faced late in the 3rd quarter at Arizona’s 10 yard line. In this instance they were trailing 17-14 and a field goal conveniently ties the score. Would anyone in their right mind go for it here? The answer should be a resounding yes. ZEUS rates the field goal attempt as a 2.5% GWC error. While the magnitude is not as great as the 4th and 1 in question, it is still tagged as a very significant error with highest confidence. To understand why something so counterintuitive can still be correct, we have to remember that the ultimate goal is to not be trailing when the clock expires (not at the end of the 3rd quarter). The fans may enjoy the temporary beauty of a tie score on the big screen after watching their team rally from a 17 point deficit, but even after Seattle ties the game, Arizona will still be in a favorite’s role. They will be taking first possession in an effectively shortened game - an 18.5 minute game to be exact. And if the outcome is undecided after regulation, they will have a 50% chance of first possession in overtime. Several other factors also need to be considered: 1) A failed attempt on 4th and 5 at the 10 yard line generally leaves the opponent in terrible field position. 2) A field goal while highly probable to succeed is not a slam dunk. 3) And finally, they might actually succeed on 4th and 5 resulting in a 4 point lead! ZEUS of course accurately weighs all of these factors through millions of simulations before deciding upon the optimum choice. So kudos to King Kaufman for joining the small, yet growing, minority of football skeptics. But even among the more astute observers of our favorite pastime, there is still quite a bit more to this game than meets the eye. |
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