SHOULD THE BUCS HAVE GONE FOR THE WIN? PigSkinRevolution.com If you have been paying close attention these past few weeks, you may have noticed that risk aversion on 4th and short has been the stimulus for some fairly serious errors.  Taking the “guaranteed” points offered by a field goal attempt can often be the compelling choice for a coach.  This is especially true when a long drive comes just short of the goal line and the coach may feel he is owed something in return for his efforts.  The complexity of these situations with respect to ball position, timeouts and score should not be underestimated.  Furthermore, when the relative strengths and weaknesses of the specific teams are considered, the optimal choice can change dramatically. When this season began, few fans would have expected the Tampa Bay and Chicago match up in week 12 to be such an intriguing game.  Both teams were carrying momentum into Tampa this Sunday and the contest was expected to be a close one.  As the Bears came away with a close 13-10 victory, two critical choices emerged as pivotal in the outcome.   The Bears were leading 10- 3 late in the 3rd quarter when they faced an important 4th and 1 decision on the Bucs’ 18 yard line.   Conventional wisdom suggests taking the easy points in these types of situations.  A successful field goal would put the Bears up by 2 scores, and this is just where one of the NFL’s leading defensive teams would like to be with approximately19 minutes remaining in the game.  ZEUS (Hypertext to homepage) says not so fast!  The Bears committed a potentially costly error here as they sacrificed nearly 2% of expected Game Winning Chance (GWC) with their choice to go for 3 points. Later in the game, it was the Bucs turn to consider a similar 4th down choice.  Here, however, Tampa Bay was facing a slightly different situation.  With just 2:51 remaining on the clock and trailing by 3 points, the Bucs encountered a 4th and 2 on the Bear’s 11 yard line.  Again, the field goal was the play of choice.  To give you an idea of just how much the custom traits of each team matter, consider that Tampa Bay’s decision to kick the field goal would be wrong by 5% GWC if the Bears and Bucs were identical in every respect.  When we apply custom inputs for the Bears defensive strength and Matt Bryant’s kicking prowess, among other variables, the decision becomes a virtual toss-up.   The Bucs could not commit a play-calling error in this situation regardless of whether they attempted the 4th down conversion or the field goal.  Only the execution of the chosen play mattered at this juncture.  Unfortunately for Tampa Bay, the seemingly sure foot of Matt Bryant proved ineffective and the Bears narrowly escaped with their seventh consecutive victory.