Belichick Examined
PigSkinRevolution.com
It is widely accepted among the NFL faithful that Bill Belichick is one of the most progressive thinkers in the game. In
fact, in the Dec. 18th issue of ESPN Magazine author Michael Lewis examines risk aversion among NFL coaches
and shows Belichick to be one of the most aggressive playcallers (ZEUS is also featured on page 46). In our own
investigations over the past few seasons, Belichick does seem to be better than average at making optimal choices
in critical play-calling situations. ZEUS has indicated in the past that the cost range to NFL teams on critical call
errors ranges between 0.6 and 1.25 games per season. Belichick has shown to be on the low end of this scale. It is
important to note the tremendous parity in the way NFL coaches behave on critical plays. While some are better than
others, ALL are making consistent errors. At the conclusion of this season we will be posting our results of the Critical
Call Index ("CCI")whereby we will examine the play-calling of all 32 NFL coaches with respect to magnitude and
frequency of error. While we suspect Belichick will perform well relative to his peers, he is by no means immune to the
conventional wisdom that is haunting the NFL.
This past weekend as the Patriots were being shutout by Miami, we had a chance to look at a few of his decisions.
According to ZEUS, the Patriots faced 8 critical decisions and erred 3 times for a total cost of 4.4% GWC. On
average, this would cost them about .7 games per season. This figure seems to be consistent with previous
examinations of Belichick's performance and this years CCI rankings will shed more light on his performance.
The first error against Miami, occurred when the Patriots were trailing by 3 with just 2:01 remaining in the first half and
facing a 4th and 7 on Miami's 42 yard line. The Patriots punted away instead of attempting a pass for the 1st down.
ZEUS suggests with highest confidence that this choice cost them 2.6% GWC. Most people will look at this decision
and immediately conclude that the Patriots are not a favorite to convert a 4th and 7. What ZEUS sees that most
humans don't, is the effect of the clock and field position on the situation. The punt on average will not provide a
significant gain in GWC at this juncture. An incomplete pass will only cost the Patriots 3.5% GWC vs. an average
punt. On the other hand, a first down with a gain of exactly 7 yards (excluding the long gain possibilities) would
increase their GWC by nearly 9% vs. the punt. The risk/reward in this particular situation is heavily biased toward the
more aggressive action. In fact, downing the punt on the 3 yard line would still be 5% GWC less effective than a 1st
and 10 on Miami's 34 yard line after a conservative pass play.
The next error may surprise many of you. Facing a 4th and 1 on their own 13 yard line and trailing by 6 at 5:51 of the
3rd quarter, ZEUS thinks the Patriots should have gone for it! The confidence factor is a moderate 5 and the
magnitude of error is only 0.5% but this recommendation still warrants some serious consideration. Punting from
the13 typically results in poor field position anyhow. With a better than even chance to keep the drive alive, these
more aggressive options unfortunately are far too often overlooked.
Having observed Belichick for many years, the last decision really surprised us. Trailing by 13 with only 12:34
remaining in the game he faced a 4th and 10 on the Dolphin's 42 yard line. Again, they are not a favorite to convert
this 1st down but when the score, clock, and field position are all properly weighted by ZEUS, punting is a clear error.
With highest Confidence, ZEUS charges the Patriots with a 1.3% GWC error. While the magnitude may be less than
the 1st error, this decision is actually worse. This is due to the fact that the Patriots squandered a larger percentage
of what small winning chances they still had. A clear blunder by Belichick.
While 4.4% aggregate error is not nearly the worst we have seen (Coughlin gave up over 13% two weeks ago) it is
still very significant. It appears even the NFL's coaching elite are still more than capable of falling far short of their full
potential.